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 ในปจัจุบนั พระราชบญัญตัลิขิสทิธิ ์พ.ศ. 2537 ได้ก าหนดโทษในทางอาญาเพื่อลงโทษ
ผู้กระท าผดิส าหรบัการกระท าอนัเป็นการละเมดิสทิธิท์ ัง้ในทางเพื่อการค้าและมใิช่เพื่อการค้า 
ดงัทีไ่ดบ้ญัญตัไิวใ้นมาตรา 69-70 แห่งพระราชบญัญตัลิขิสทิธิ ์พ.ศ. 2537  ซึง่เกนิกว่าพนัธกรณี 
ที่ประเทศไทยจะต้องปฏบิตัติามที่ได้ระบุไว้ในบทบัญญตัขิอ้ 61 แห่งความตกลงทรปิส์ (TRIPs 
Agreement) ซึ่งก าหนดให้ประเทศภาคกี าหนดโทษในทางอาญาส าหรบัการละเมดิลขิสิทธิใ์น 
ทางเพื่อการคา้เท่านัน้ โทษในทางอาญาดงักล่าวไดท้ าใหเ้กดิปญัหาในทางปฏบิตัมิากมาย อาท ิ
เช่น เจา้ของลขิสทิธิอ์าจใชโ้ทษในทางอาญาเป็นเครื่องมอืในการรดีไถผูล้ะเมดิลขิสทิธิใ์นทางมใิช่
เพื่อการค้าจ่ายเงนิใหก้บัเจา้ของลขิสทิธิเ์พื่อแลกกบัการไม่ด าเนินคดใีนทางอาญา นอกจากนัน้
แลว้มาตรา 76 แห่งพระราชบญัญตัลิขิสทิธิย์งับญัญตัใิหจ้่ายค่าปรบัทีไ่ดช้ าระตามค าพพิากษาแก่
เจา้ของลขิสทิธิ ์หรอืสทิธขิองนักแสดงกึ่งหน่ึง อนัเป็นการกระตุ้นให้เจ้าของลขิสทิธิด์ าเนินคดี
อาญาแก่ผู้ละเมิดลิขสิทธิ ์ เพราะค่าปรับกึ่งหนึ่ งที่จะได้ร ับนั ้นอาจเป็นจ านวนมากกว่า            
ความเสยีหายทีแ่ทจ้รงิกเ็ป็นได ้จงึท าใหเ้กดิการวจิารณ์กนัอย่างหลากหลายว่าโทษทีบ่งัคบัใชอ้ยู่
ในปจัจุบนันัน้เหมาะสมหรอืไม่ บทความนี้จงึไดว้เิคราะหถ์งึความไม่เหมาะสมของโทษดงักล่าว
โดยใช้ทฤษฎีทางอาญา บทบัญญัติแห่งกฎหมายระหว่างประเทศในเรื่องสิทธิมนุษยชน                
การวเิคราะหใ์นเชงิเศรษฐกจิของโทษอาญาในกฎหมายลขิสทิธิ ์
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ABSTRACT 
 
Presently, the Copyright Act B.E. 2537 has imposed criminal sanctions to both 
of the commercial and non-commercial purposes infringements as stated in sections 69-
70 of such Act; which have exceeded the obligation under Article 61 of the TRIPs 
Agreement that requires the state members to provide criminal penalties to be applied 
at least in cases of copyright piracy on a commercial scale. This has created many 
drawbacks in the copyright protection system. For example, the criminal penalties may 
be used by the copyright owners as tools to threaten the infringers to pay them money. 
Moreover, section 76 of the Copyright Act B.E. 2537 states that “One half of the fine 
paid in accordance with the judgment shall be paid to the owner of copyright or 
performer's rights…” has encouraged the copyright owners to prosecute criminal cases 
against the infringers; as the amount of fines they may receive might exceed the amount 
of actual losses they suffer. As a result, the criminal sanctions under the Thai copyright 
law are said to be over-criminalized to protect the rights of the owners. Therefore, this 
article shall assess the impropriety of the current criminal sanctions based on the 
principles of crimes, the human right claims, and the economic analysis of criminal 
copyright law.  
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Introduction 
 
Thailand has become one of the WTO members since January 1995.1  This has 
placed an obligation for Thailand to implement the TRIPS Agreement into its own law 
in order to provide a minimum standard of protection for IPRs2.  One requirement under 
the TRIPS Agreement is that of the imposition of the criminal penalties; in which Article 
61 states that: 
 “Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at 
least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial 
scale….” 3 
 It can be seen that Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement only places a minimum 
standard of criminal penalties to only be applied in cases of copyright piracy on a 
commercial scale. This means that the member countries could also apply criminal 
penalties to other cases such as non-commercial scale infringements rather than what is 
stated in Article 61.  
 In order for Thailand to comply with such obligation, criminal sanctions have 
been imposed under the Copyright Act B.E. 2537; which may be found in sections 69-
77 of such Act. However, in this article, I would like to merely focus on the criminal 
sanctions which are imposed to the primary and secondary infringing conducts which 
are as of the followings: 
Section 69: Any person who infringes the copyright or the performer’s rights according 
to Section 27, Section 28, Section 29, Section 30 or Section 52 shall be liable to a fine 
from twenty thousand Baht up to two hundred thousand Baht. 
                                                 
1World Trade Organization, “Member Information: Thailand and the WTO,” at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/thailand_e.htm, (last visited 16 
March 2014). 
2 World Trade Organization, “Thailand's economic success set to continue as 
exports keep growing,” (1 December 1995), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop 
e/tpr_e/tp21_e.htm, (last visited 16 March 2014) 
3 Ibid. 
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         If the offence in paragraph one is committed with commercial purposes, 
the offender shall be liable to imprisonment for a term from six months up to four years 
or to a fine from one hundred thousand Baht up to eight hundred thousand Baht, or to 
both. 
Section 70: Any person who commits a copyright infringement according to Section 31 
shall be liable to a fine from ten thousand Baht up to one hundred thousand Baht. 
         If the offence in paragraph one is committed with commercial purposes, 
the offender shall be liable to imprisonment for a term from three months up to two 
years or to a fine from fifty thousand Baht up to four hundred thousand Baht, or to both. 
 From what is above provided, section 69 of the Copyright Act B.E. 2537 states 
the criminal sanctions for the primary copyright infringements; while section 70 of the 
same Act provides criminal sanctions for the secondary copyright infringements. 
However, both of the provisions have inflicted criminal sanctions to non-commercial 
and commercial purposes infringements; which have exceeded the obligation under the 
Trips Agreement.  
However, there were many criticisms that the criminal sanctions imposed to the 
non-commercial purpose infringements are not suitable in solving such infringing 
problems. Instead, they have created many drawbacks in the copyright protection 
system. For example, the criminal penalties may be used by the copyright owners as 
tools to threaten the infringers to pay them money. Moreover, section 76 of the 
Copyright Act B.E. 2537 states that “One half of the fine paid in accordance with the 
judgment shall be paid to the owner of copyright or performer's rights…” has 
encouraged the copyright owners to prosecute criminal cases against the infringers; as 
the amount of fines they may receive might exceed the amount of actual losses they 
suffer. As a result, the criminal sanctions under the Thai copyright law are said to be 
over-criminalized to protect the rights of the owners. Therefore, those owners have 
preferred to use criminal prosecutions for their cases instead of the civil litigations. This 
is in the opposite direction from most of other countries; which mainly use civil 
litigations to compensate for the copyright owners’ losses. This can be seen by the 
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statistics of the Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court as of the 
followings4:  
 
The statistics of criminal and civil cases of the copyright infringement from 
B.E. 2551-2555 
Year Criminal Cases Civil cases 
2555 1,299 (96.22%) 51 (3.77%) 
2554 1,377 (96.84%) 45 (3.16%) 
2553 1,995 (98.13%) 38 (1.87%) 
2552 2,732 (98.13%) 52 (1.86%) 
2551 2626 (97.66%) 63 (2.34%) 
 
Hence, in order for the government to find and impose appropriate criminal sanctions to 
the copyright infringing conducts, many factors shall be taken into their considerations. 
Specifically, Article 7 and 8 of the TRIPS agreement shall be of their primary concerns; 
in which Article 7 notes that “protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
should be contributed to the promotion of technological innovation” Meanwhile, this 
protection must also conducive to the “social and economic welfare” In addition, 
Article 8 also provides that “Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and 
regulations, adopt measures necessary… to promote the public interest in sectors of 
vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development…” This means 
that, to criminalize any infringing conduct, it shall not be arbitrarily done without any 
concern to the objectives defined in the above stated provisions. In addition, please also 
bear in mind that intellectual property rights are private rights as stated in the preamble 
of the TRIPS Agreement.  Consequently, by imposing criminal penalties to suppress the 
small- scale infringing conducts, the state has to put a lot of its resources and budgets 
for the enforcement to protect the private rights of the people not for the public benefits. 
Hence, the issue is then arisen of whether the enforcement to protect the intellectual 
                                                 
4 See The Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, at 
http://www.ipitc.coj.go.th/info.php?cid=19&pm=19, (last visited 16 March 2014). 
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property rights should really be a criminal matter in every case of the infringing 
conduct? If the conflict is between the private parties, then should civil remedies be used 
to solve the problem instead of the criminal sanctions? 
 To answer those questions, this article has divided the assessments into 3 
perspectives based on the principles of crimes, the human right claims, and the economic 
analysis of criminal copyright law. 
 
1. The Assessment According to the Principle of Crimes 
In order for the infringers to be inflicted by the criminal sanctions, three of the 
following elements must be met: 
a. Culpability 
 The term “Culpability” can be defined as “the moral value attributed to a 
defendant’s state of mind during the commission of a crime”5 Under the traditional 
concept of the criminal law, in order to consider the elements of any wrongful act, it 
must be consisting of the culpable mental state or what is known as “mens rea”, 
“criminal intent” or “guilty mind”.6 In other words, “no one can be guilty of a crime 
unless he or she acted with the knowledge of doing something wrong”7 The essence of 
this principle is that the offender must know that his conduct is wrong. Nevertheless, it 
does not mean that the offender has to know the Penal Code, it requires that he or she 
knows that there is no right to do such thing – and chooses to commit it anyway.8 
b. Social Harmfulness 
 The purpose of every crime is in order to prevent social harm from happening.9 
Social harmfulness mirrors the degree that a criminal act causes harm; in which is an 
                                                 
5  Stuart P. Green, “Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag off a Mattress: 
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses,” The Emory Law 
Journal 47 (1998): 1548. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Freda A. Adler et al., Criminology, 7th ed. (United States: McGraw-Hill, Inc, 
2009), p. 209. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., p. 208. 
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interruption of a person’s interest.10 In contrast with culpability, social harmfulness 
emphasizes on the act and its consequences not the actor.11 In some cases, the criminal 
acts are considered being harmful but not wrongful.12 The example in this case is when 
a victim gives consent to a commission of a crime.13  
c. Moral Wrongfulness 
 The moral wrongfulness refers to as “the violation of a moral norm that occurs 
when a criminal act is committed”14 Similar to social harmfulness, it emphasizes on the 
moral content more than the moral status of the defendant.15 According to Stuart P. 
Green16, he stated that “what makes an act wrongful is some intrinsic violation of a 
freestanding moral rule or duty, rather than the act’s consequences.”17  Therefore, it was 
agreeable to treat criminal conduct with punishment when it is morally wrong.18  In 
order to consider what should be criminalized, it may depend on community norms or 
                                                 
10 Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (LexisNexis, 1995), p. 96. 
11 Stuart P. Green, Ibid., p. 1549. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Heidi M. Hurd, “What in the World is Wrong?”  Journal of Contemporary 
Legal Issues 157, 159 (1994): 5. 
14 Stuart P. Green, Lying Cheating and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-
Collar Crime, (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 30. 
15  Stuart P. Green, “Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag off a Mattress: 
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses,” p. 1551. 
16  Stuart P. Green is the professor of law at Rutgers University-Newark 
specialized in criminal law. He is a founding co-editor of Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice Books. 
17 Stuart P. Green, Ibid, p. 1551. 
18 Heidi Hurd, “What In the World Is Wrong?,” Contemporary Legal Issues 
(1994): 157, concluding that conducts which are morally wrong should be prohibited as 
the objective of every law is “to perfect our compliance with the demands of morality.” 
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principles extracted from the concept of what is right and good.19 It was believed that 
“Criminals deserve punishment because they violate norms established by society.”20 
Under this principle, criminal sanctions would still be applied even if it could not 
prevent future harm.21  
Consequently, when the state would like to inflict criminal sanctions on the 
copyright infringers, all of the three elements must also be met. Therefore, the copyright 
infringing conducts shall be assessed to such elements. In this case, a culpable state of 
mind is included in the moral wrongfulness issue. In other words, a person is said to be 
culpable when he or she decided to commit a wrongful conduct. The analysis of harm 
and moral wrongfulness of copyright infringement is as of the followings: 
 
1.1 The Harm Principle 
 The justifications to apply criminal sanctions to harmful conducts are when 
(1) there is an injury to a person.22 (2) Such injury affects a societal interest23 or (3) it 
directly injures the government policy; in this case is the national policy of intellectual 
property.24 Moreover, the criminal sanctions can be applied only when other methods 
of deterring the conducts are not sufficient to do so. 
  1.1.1 The Harm to the Copyright Owner 
                                                 
19  Peter Arenella, “Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the 
Relationship between Legal and Moral Accountability,” UCLA Law Review 39 (1992): 
1522-23. 
20 Kent Greenawalt, “Punishment,” Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice 4 (United 
States: The Free Press, 1983): 1338. 
21  Immanuel  Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, (United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 142. 
22 Geraldine Szott Moohr, “The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry 
Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory,” Boston University Law Review 83 
(2003): 27. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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  It is inevitable to say that the act of infringement harms the 
copyright owners in some ways. However, the question still remains of how to measure 
the harm as loss to the copyright owners. For example, there is estimation from the 
Institute for Policy Innovation of the United States that there is $12.5 billion loss every 
year resulting from the global music piracy.25 However, please be reminded that people 
who infringe on the right of the copyright owner by downloading music from the internet 
illegally; are not necessary the same group of people who intended to purchase the music 
at first.26 Therefore, by including the losses deriving from their losses in purchase could 
not really indicate the harm received by the copyright owners.27 In addition, when the 
products of the copyright holders are copied; they do not suffer similar losses as in the 
case of shop owners who would have to bear a direct loss from the event of theft.28 This 
means that the loss of the copyright owners could not really be calculated into accurate 
numbers. Nevertheless, despite the vagueness in measuring the exact number of loss 
that the copyright holders encountered, it is accepted that there are wide ranges of loss 
that they suffer from different groups of infringers. 
  First, the harm which causes by the copyright owners’ competitors 
and those who intended to conduct the infringements for commercial gain are considered 
being significant losses to copyright owners as they lost their market positions.29 This 
could create such an unfair competition and thus a competitive harm to them.30 In 
addition, a direct linkage between the economic gains of the competitors and loss of the 
owners can be seen and estimated.31 Consequently, applying the criminal sanctions to 
                                                 
25 At http://www.riaa.com/faq.php; (last visited 15 November 2013). 
26Miriam Bitton, “Rethinking the anti-counterfeiting trade agreement’s criminal 
copyright enforcement measures,” The Journal and Criminal Law & Criminology 102 
(2012): 72. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Geraldine Szott Moohr, Boston University Law Review, p. 31. 
30 See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) 
31 Ibid. 
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this type of infringement seems to constitute the purpose of the copyright law; which 
aims to protect the owners from unfair competitions.32 
  On the other hand, the harm causes by noncompetitive individual 
infringers can be assessed differently. As stated earlier, people who infringe the right of 
the owners for their personal uses are not necessary the same group of people who would 
purchase the products in the first place. Therefore, the harm causes by them are not 
easily identified. And even if we accept that there are such losses, the injury created by 
each of the individual is very slight comparing with the sum of revenues or the total lost 
in profits. 33  Moreover, each of the individual’s harm does not exactly affect the 
community’s interest as a whole. Even though what remains in the issue is the 
accumulative harm caused by many individuals altogether34 , but applying criminal 
sanctions to each of the individual for his or her slightly harmful conduct does not seem 
to fit with the principle of criminalization.  
   In addition, sections 69 and 70 of the Copyright Act B.E. 2537 
also set the minimum amount of fines that the infringers are required to pay; which are 
twenty thousand Baht for the primary infringements and ten thousand Baht for the 
secondary infringements. In some cases, such penalties may not be proportionate to acts 
of infringements; which cause very slight or no harm to the owners. For example, if a 
person makes a copy of a copyrighted book just for himself, and he has no intention in 
buying it, may be subjected to pay fine in the amount of 20,000 Baht. It can be seen that 
his act of infringement does not exactly contribute to the copyright owner’s loss of 
profit, but he is required to pay at least the minimum amount of fine of twenty thousand 
Baht. Therefore such punishment may not be proportionate to the harm caused by the 
infringing act. Besides, the Court cannot suspend the punishment of fine as the 
suspension of punishment under section 56 of the Penal Code of Thailand is only applied 
to cases of imprisonment. 
                                                 
32 Geraldine Szott Moohr, op. cit., p. 31 
33  See Richard L. Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It’s 
Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life, (2002), p. 46, Table 3.1. 
34 Geraldine Szott Moohr, op. cit., p. 32. 
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  Furthermore, section 76 of the Copyright Act B.E. 2537 which 
provides that “one half of the fine paid in accordance with the judgment shall be paid to 
the owner of copyright” This means that those owners are entitled to receive at least ten 
thousand Baht for the primary infringements; and five thousand Baht for the secondary 
infringement. In some cases, such amount of payments may far more exceed the amount 
of their losses. As a consequence, those copyright owners are encouraged to prosecute 
criminal cases instead of the civil ones. 
  The example could be found in the Supreme Court decision 
number 6576/2551. From the fact of the case, the offender went to a theater and used 
the video camera to videotape the movie called “Train of the Dead”; which was the 
copyright work of the Pra Nakorn Film Co., Ltd. The company then prosecuted the 
offender claiming that he infringed the copyright of the owner by reproducing or 
adapting the substantial part of the movie without the authorization of the company who 
was the copyright owner. The Supreme Court’s Division for Intellectual Property and 
International Trade held that the offender committed the crime of infringement under 
section 28 (1) and 69 paragraph 1 of the Copyright Act B.E. 2537. Therefore, he was 
required to pay fine in the amount of 20,000 Baht and such punishment could not be 
suspended according to section 56 of the Penal Code of Thailand. However, the offender 
confessed; which was for the benefit of the trial. Thus, the penalty should be reduced to 
one half according to section 78 of the Penal Code of Thailand; and half of the fine shall 
be paid to the copyright owner according to section 76 of the Copyright Act B.E. 2537. 
 
  1.1.2   Harm to the National Copyright Policy 
   The national copyright policy is to motivate the new creations of 
expressed works.35 Therefore, if the copyrighted works are subject to use without any 
authorization or payment; then no one would be encouraged to produce new expression 
of ideas.36 Adding criminal sanctions to the copyright law may be one of the methods 
to ensure that such goal would be achieved. 
                                                 
35 Geraldine Szott Moohr, op. cit., p. 32. 
36 Ibid. 
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   According to the Intellectual Property Strategies of Thailand B.E. 
2556-255937, it is one of the main seven strategies that the government has a duty to 
promote the creations of intellectual property in order to use such products to compete 
in the international markets. Therefore, it could be said that the Thai national copyright 
policy is also aimed to provide incentives for creators to create new expressed works. 
  However, in the case of non-commercial purpose infringements, only 
slight harm is caused to the copyright owners. The losses in economic profits of those 
owners are not significant. Consequently, such infringements are not a cause to 
demotivate creators to create new expressed works as they may still gain a good amount 
of profits from their creations. Thus, the national copyright policy of motivating new 
creations is not affected in this case. It is therefore not necessary to impose criminal 
penalties to escort the national copyright policy from the harm caused by non-
commercial purpose infringements. 
  In contrast, for the commercial purpose infringements, there could be a 
significant harm to the copyright owners. The high potential infringers may cause those 
owners to lose their shares in the markets. If such losses are up to the point where it is 
not worth in investing their skills judgments and labors to earn profits; then there would 
not be a motivation for them to create new works. As a result, the commercial purpose 
infringements may have an important impact on the national copyright policy. The 
imposition of criminal penalties may help to safeguard such policy of motivating new 
creative works. 
 
1.2 The Moral Wrongfulness Principle 
  Another factor in criminalizing a conduct is when it is morally wrongful. In order 
to assess the moral wrongfulness of the copyright infringing conducts, Trotter Hardy38 
                                                 
37  Department of Intellectual Property, at http://www.ipthailand.go.th, (last 
visited: 16 March 2014). 
38  Trotter T. Hardy Jr. is the professor of Law and Associate Dean of 
Technology, Academic-Post-Secondary, College of William and Mary, School of law 
specialized in intellectual property law.  
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has divided the copyright infringers into three types.39 The first type of infringers is 
those who commit the infringements on a large scale to be able to receive commercial 
gains from copyrighted works.40 People usually view this type of infringement as a 
moral wrongful conduct.41The second type of infringers is people who do not have 
financial motive in infringing copyright; but commit such conduct on a smaller scale to 
stimulate learning or creativity.42The society does not have a view that they deserve to 
be punished by the criminal sanctions.43 The last type of infringers resulted from the 
emergence of technological advancement. They are people “who have no particular 
profit motive, but who use the Internet to cause, or to avail themselves of, infringements 
multiplied on a huge scale.”44 Even though, copyright holders suffer harm by such 
conduct; but the infringers do not receive any commercial gain for it. Therefore, the 
society also does not view them as deserving criminal penalties.45 
  When applying Trotter Hardy’s assessment to section 69 of the Copyright Act 
B.E. 2537, it can be seen that the first type of infringers who have commercial motives 
in committing the acts of infringements constitute the group of people that section 69 
paragraph 2 is aimed to inflict criminal penalties upon. People in the society have a 
common opinion that they are morally wrongful conducts which should be criminalized. 
Therefore, there is a justification in imposing criminal penalties to this type of wrongful 
conduct. 
  For the second type of infringers, which are a group of people who commit the 
infringing conduct for learning or creativity without the commercial motives; some of 
the infringing acts may consider being a fair use of the copyright works under section 
                                                 
39 Trotter Hardy, “Criminal Copyright Infringement,” William & Mary Bill of 
Rights Journal 11 (2002): 305, 326-332. 
40 Trotter Hardy, Ibid., p. 326-327. 
41 Ibid., p. 327. 
42 Ibid., p. 326. 
43 Ibid., p. 327. 
44 Ibid., p. 326. 
45 Ibid., p. 328. 
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32 of the Copyright Act B.E. 2537. However, if such conducts do not constitute a fair 
use, then they would constitute a group of infringers who are subjected to criminal 
penalties under section 69 paragraph 1. Nevertheless, for this type of infringements, 
people do not have a view that they are morally wrongful conducts. Therefore, criminal 
penalties as imposed by section 69 paragraph 1 shall not be inflicted upon them. 
  The last type of infringers is the people who use the internet to cause 
infringements to multiply on a huge scale. They are considered being a group of people 
who are subjected to criminal penalties under section 69 paragraph 1. In this case, people 
in the community also do not have a view that they have evil minds to commit morally 
wrongful conducts as they do not gain profits for themselves; and therefore criminal 
sanctions shall not be inflicted upon them; even though copyright owners suffer harm 
from such conducts.   
  From all of the above assessment for the moral wrongfulness of the conducts; it 
can be seen that the infringement acts which are subjected to criminal penalties under 
section 69 paragraph 1 are said to be lacking the moral wrongfulness content.   
  Consequently, neither of the harm nor moral wrongfulness principles has 
suggested that criminal penalties shall be imposed to the non-commercial purpose 
infringements. This is due to the fact that such acts of infringements only cause slight 
harms to the copyright owners; and therefore, they are not the factor which would affect 
the national copyright policy by reducing the incentives of the creators to create more 
works. Moreover, people in the society do not usually view them as moral wrongful 
conducts.  
  Nevertheless, the outcome of the assessment is different in the case of 
commercial purpose infringing conducts. The harm they cause may place significant 
effects on the economics of the owners; which create unfair competitions for those 
owners to lose their positions in the markets. If the losses of profits exceed the costs 
which they have invested in the works, these would definitely discourage the owners to 
produce more creations. As a result, the national copyright policy is deteriorated due to 
such infringements. In addition, the society has a common view that such unfair 
competitions are moral wrongful conducts. Therefore, from the assessment according to 
the principle of crimes, it has led to a conclusion that there is a justification in imposing 
criminal penalties to the commercial purpose infringing conducts.  
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2. The Assessment According to the Human Right Claim 
  Presently, the protection of copyright is crucially important that the international 
instrument has also giving it a precedence that it is one form of human right. From a 
human right approach, it is an implicit tool in stating a balance between the right of the 
authors and the benefits of the society. 
  The first identification in the international instrument can be found in   Article 
27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which reads: 
   “(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 
   (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the 
author.” 
  According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the protection of 
rights and claim made under article 27 are regarded to be universal and lie in each person 
in the virtue of the common humanity.46 Consequently, they are very vital norms that 
the governments are obliged to escort and uphold the rights.47 Such obligation is applied 
to all the governments in the same way that they are supposed to gratify common interest 
of humanity.48In addition, due to the fact that that it is entitled to be universal, its 
implementation should be in a way that the most disadvantaged and vulnerable person 
would receive a benefit from it.49 Consequently, the protection must not only serve 
specific group of people who already acquire privilege positions.50 On the other hand, it 
should be able to benefit everyone beyond the benefits received from the application of 
                                                 
46 Paul L.C. Torremans. “Is Copyright a Right?,” Michigan State Law Review  
271. (2007): 5. 
47 Ibid. 
48 J.W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights: Philosophical Reflections on 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (United States: University of California 
Press, 1987), p. 3. 
 
50 Paul L.C. Torremans, Ibid., p. 5. 
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such protection. 51  The example in this case would be better goods and services 
throughout the nations.52 Therefore, it could be said that the purpose behind Article 27 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is that there has to be a balance between 
the rights stated in Article 27 (1) and those expressed in Article 27 (2)53 
  The second indication in the international instrument can be found in Article 15 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It is a follow up 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Though, it is in the form of a treaty that 
the contracting parties like Thailand are obliged to implement its provisions.54  Article 
15 is as stated: 
   “1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone:  
    (a) To take part in cultural life;  
    (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications;  
    (c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.  
   2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for the 
conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture.  
   3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the 
freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.  
   4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be 
derived from the encouragement and development of international contacts and co-
operation in the scientific and cultural fields.” 
  As it can be seen, the first paragraph of the Covenant has very much depended 
on Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For the later paragraphs, it 
has imposed a series of responsibilities and measures to be taken by the Contracting 
                                                 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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States to protect copyright as a Human Right.55  On this matter, the Committee on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, who were considered being the authorized 
interpreter of the ICESCR, emphasized that “importance of the integration of 
international human rights norms into the enactment and interpretation of intellectual 
property law should be in a balanced manner that protects public and private interests 
in knowledge; without infringing on fundamental human rights.”56 
  From the two provisions provided in the international Human Rights 
instruments, it can be concluded that their core objective is to emphasize on balancing 
of rights and interests.57 However, there are two dimensions when referring to this 
balance. The first one is a balance in the copyright itself; between that of the private 
interests of the copyright owners and public benefits.58 For the second dimension, there 
must also be a balance between copyright and other Human Rights stated in the 
international instrument59 may be assessed that: 
 
 2.1  A Balance between Private and Public Interest 
   On one side of the scale, it is necessary to protect the private interest of the 
authors. This is in order to motivate authors to create further creations.60 The protection 
is in the form of granting certain amount of exclusive rights relating to the use of his or 
her work. On the other hand, in order to protect the public interest as a whole, the 
                                                 
55 Paul L.C. Torremans, Ibid., p. 5. 
56 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 
3, 5th Session, in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/ GEN/1/ Rev.5, page 18 
57 Paul L.C. Torremans, Ibid. 
58 J.A.L. Stering, World Copyright Law, (United Kingdom: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1998), p. 40. 
59 Paul L.C. Torremans, Ibid., p. 10. 
60 Ibid., p. 11. 
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copyright law must ensure that the public must be able to have access to those 
copyrighted works to promote progress and improvement.61 
   One way of escorting the private interest of the copyright owners, the 
government has imposed criminal penalties as stated in sections 69 and 70 to combat 
the acts of infringements in both commercial and non-commercial purposes conducts. 
Such penalties may create a belief for people in the community that copyright actually 
belongs to the owner the way tangible property does. The copyright owner has an 
absolute control over his work and thus, people who access and use the copyright works 
of the owners are like thieves who steal the properties of others. This is in contradiction 
with the principle of copyright; which the owners only have limited rights known as 
“exclusive rights” over their works; in order for the public to access to the ideas behind 
the copyrighted works to create further creations. As a result, such belief of ownership 
may hinder people from accessing to the works of others as they believe that such works 
are the properties of others; which would cause an imbalance between private and public 
interests. 
   In addition, when criminal penalties are imposed not in proportion to the 
wrongful conducts, as assessed above in the case of non-commercial purpose 
infringements; people may fear that their acts of accessing others’ works may subject 
them to criminal penalties. As a result, they would refuse to access to the works and the 
ideas behind them; even if it is legal to do so. This factor also contributes to the 
imbalance of interests between that of the public and private owners; which contradicts 
with what the international Human Rights instruments are trying to achieve. 
   Therefore, it can be analyzed that the imposition of criminal penalties to the 
non-commercial purpose infringements may result in over protection of the private 
rights. If harsh penalties are applied to small scale acts of infringements, which should 
actually be a matter of the civil litigations; the fears of criminal penalties would keep 
people away from accessing to the copyright works causing a reduction in incentives to 
                                                 
61  United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human 
Rights, Sub-Provisional Agenda, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights- The Impact of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human 
Rights, Report of the High commissioner, E/CN.4/Sub/2/2001/13, Page 5 
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produce new creations. Consequently, the protection of the private rights may outweigh 
the other side of the scale; which is the public interests. Thus, the enactments of criminal 
penalties to the non-commercial purpose infringements are not in compliance with   
Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 15 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
 
 2.2  A Balance between Copyright and other Human Rights 
   For the balance between copyright and other Human Rights, it was required 
that the interpretation of Article 15 should be based upon the main objective of 
promoting and escorting human rights.62This assumption was drawn from the fact that 
Article 15 has to be read in concurrence with Article 5 of the ICESCR63; which it 
provides that: 
   “Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any 
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed 
at the destruction of any of the rights or freedoms recognized herein, or at their 
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.”64  
   This means that whenever there is a conflict between private benefits of the 
authors and the public interests arising out of intellectual property, the balance of such 
interests should not be interpreted in a way that it would cause a detriment to any other 
Human Rights recognized in the Covenant and any other instruments.65 
                                                 
62  United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human 
Rights, Sub-Provisional Agenda, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights- The Impact of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human 
Rights, Report of the High commissioner, E/CN.4/Sub/2/2001/13, Page 5 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 See E/C. 12/2000/12, paragraph 31 
“The human rights principle of self-determination as enunciated in Article 1 (1) of the 
Covenant and reflected in the civil and political rights defined in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights emphasizes the right of all members of society 
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   The Human Right which the interpretation of a conflict between private and 
public interests may have a detrimental effect upon is the right to freedom to seek for 
information and ideas. According to Article 19 (2) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which Thailand is one of the member parties; it 
provides that: 
   “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other media of his choice.” 
   As stated, the imposition of criminal penalties to the copyright law may cause 
a declination of public accesses to the copyrighted works due to the fears of such 
penalties. Therefore, when severe criminal penalties are applied to small scale acts of 
infringements, it would definitely create an imbalance between those two interests; in 
which it can be interpreted in a way that the interests of the copyright owners are more 
important than the public access to the works. Thus, such precedence itself limits the 
public access; which leads to a restriction of freedom for people to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds as stated in Article 19 of the ICCPR.  
Consequently, the imbalance of interests from the imposition of impropriate criminal 
penalties to the copyright law also causes a detrimental effect in limiting the other 
Human Right of freedom to seek for information and ideas as it is more restrictive for 
the public to have access to the copyrighted works. 
 
3.  The Assessment According to the Economic Analysis of Criminal Copyright 
Law 
  The last dimension that can be used to assess the need in criminalizing the 
infringing conducts is through the economic perspective of the copyright law. In this 
case, the rent seeking model shall be introduced to explain the reason why there was a 
                                                 
to participate in a meaningful way in deciding on their governance and their economic, 
social and cultural development.  This translates into a right to societal decision-making 
on setting priorities for and major decisions regarding the development of intellectual 
property regimes….” 
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drive by many interest groups in applying criminal sanctions in order to protect the 
interests of their works; while the cost – benefit analysis is utilized to see whether there 
are more benefits than the costs of applying the criminal sanctions to the copyright law.  
 
 3.1  The Rent Seeking Model 
   In order to understand the term “rent seeking”, we must first look at the 
definition of rent from the economic theory. According to Professor Buchanan66, rent 
can be defined as: 
   “…. part of the payment to an owner of resources over and above that which 
those resources could command in any alternative use. Rent is receipt in excess of 
opportunity cost.” 67Therefore, the owners of the resources usually engage in rent 
seeking; in which is another term for profit seeking.68  
   In a regular market structure, the economic rents act as motivators attracting 
both of the resources owners and entrepreneurs to combine those resources into 
products.69 If they are continuously searching for opportunities to earn economic rent as 
well as making the most out of the existing opportunities, then the process of resource 
reallocation would be created. This would bring about a development and growth in the 
economic system.70  
   However, the economic rents can be reduced when the market is changed to 
be in accordance with the new emerging opportunities.71Suppose, there is no barrier for 
other entrepreneurs to gain access to the market and sell the same products; which causes 
                                                 
66 James McGill Buchanan, Jr. was an economist known for his work on public 
choice theory. He was a professor at George Mason University. 
67 James M. Buchanan et al, Toward a Theory of The Rent-Seeking Society, 
(United States: Texas A & M University 1980), p. 5. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
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an increase in the outputs and the price to drop.72 Consequently, the economic rent of 
the first entrepreneurs is reduced and distributed to other producers; due to the process 
of adjustment in the competitive market. 73  
   Nevertheless, such situations could be prevented if there are some forms of 
restrictions to bar other producers from entering and compete with the first 
producers.74Then, those first producers could still maintain their economic rents at the 
optimum level; creating monopoly rents for them. If such monopolies are retained, they 
are then able to rely on those restrictions to earn the utmost amount of economic rents 
from their products.75As a result, there is no necessity for them to invest new resources 
in order to discover new methods of production.76 
   One way of creating restrictions upon entry of other producers is through a 
copyright protection. In this case, a government grants a monopoly for the first 
producers in the form of exclusive rights to exclude others from entering and competing 
with them. From this, they can realize monopoly position in the market and are able to 
maximize profits from their productions. However, this situation would not create a 
direct transfer between consumers’ loss and producers’ gain.77 There are eventually 
some costs that producers have to bear from the unproductive searching for such 
monopoly.78 This creates dead-weight losses; which can be defined as “the net loss of 
consumer surplus which occurs when rent seeking is successful in transferring consumer 
                                                 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74  Lanier Saperstein, “Copyrights, Criminal Sanctions and Economic Rents: 
Applying the Rent Seeking Model to the Criminal Law Formulation Process,” The 
Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 87 (1997): 1485. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Lanier Saperstein Ibid. 
77 Ibid., p. 1489. 
78 Ibid. 
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surplus into producer surplus.” 79  To be specific, resources will be spent until the 
producers receive the same return as other kinds of investment. In other words, if the 
producers are able to yield a higher return by investing resources to lobby the 
government than improving their productions, then they are likely to do so rather than 
spending new resources into the development of their products.80 
   However, presently, many interest groups have a view that only civil remedies 
may not be enough in deterring the behaviors of the potential competitors.81This is due 
to the fact that the civil damages that they are obliged to pay may not be sufficient to 
cover the profits they earn from doing their businesses.82Moreover, presently, the fast 
growing technology makes it much easier to duplicate and start the businesses at a much 
lower cost. 83 Therefore, after all those payments of civil remedies, the potential 
competitors can quickly re-enter the market to compete again.84 
   Therefore, in order to fulfill their needs of maximizing their profits, many 
interest groups have pressured and lobbied the government to impose criminal sanctions 
to apply to those infringement acts 85 ; as a considerable amount of fines and 
imprisonment may be able to bar them from entering into competitions with those 
interest groups; who have initially gained their monopoly positions through the 
protection of copyright law. 
   From all of the above stated reasons, it can be seen that the imposition of the 
criminal penalties are due to the pressures and lobbying process of the interest groups 
in order to secure their monopoly positions. The application of fines and imprisonment 
                                                 
79 Lanier Saperstein, Ibid., p. 1507 from the author’s discussion with Professor 
Patrick Dunleavy, Department of Government, London School of Economics & 
Political Science (Dec. 1, 1993). 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
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can help them achieving their goal of maximizing their economic rents by barring their 
competitors to compete in the market. From this, it demonstrates the support of the 
argument that the imposition of the criminal penalties in the copyright law to protect the 
private rights of those interest groups; in which it should actually be a matter of civil 
remedies to cover for such losses.  
 
 3.2  The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Imposing Criminal Penalties to the 
Copyright Law 
   The cost-benefit analysis can be referred to as a method that is used to 
compare the pros and the cons of a proposal.86 It is used as a tool to determine whether 
the outcome is worth spending all those resources in such proposal.87In other words, 
economists apply cost-benefit analysis in order to assess if the social welfare would be 
better off by implementing the decision.88 
   When applying cost-benefit analysis to the imposition of criminal penalties 
to copyright law, it means that there is a justification for treating an infringement 
conduct as a crime; if the whole community is in a better position when treating it as 
such.89Therefore, the benefits from the prevention of harm that is caused by such 
conduct shall exceed the costs of punishing and stigmatizing it.90In addition, cost- 
benefit analysis is especially useful in analyzing the copyright law where community 
benefit is measured by balancing the rights of the authors and the public access.91 
Consequently, a clear picture of community benefit may be drawn from evaluating cost 
and benefit of each side of the balance. The application of cost-benefit analysis to the 
imposition of criminal penalties is as of the followings: 
                                                 
86 Geraldine Szott Moohr, “Defining Overcriminalization Through Cost-Benefit 
Analysis: The Example of Criminal Copyright Laws,” American University Law 
Review 54 (2005): 785. 
87 Geraldine Szott Moohr, American University Law Review 54, p. 785. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
A s s u m p t i o n  U n i v e r s i t y  L a w  J o u r n a l  | 25 
ปีท่ี 5 ฉบับท่ี 2 กรกฎาคม – ธันวาคม 2557 
 
  3.2.1  The Benefits of Criminalizing Copyright Infringement Conducts. 
    a. The Benefit of Preventing Harm 
     The copyright infringing conducts could create two types of harms. 
The first type is harm to the financial status of the copyright owners; while the second 
type refers to harm imposed to the national policy of motivating new creative efforts. 
The infringing conducts harm the copyright owners’ interests by taking away their 
exclusive rights as the only distributors of their copyrighted products.92As a result, they 
tend to receive less income from sales and granting licenses.93Consequently, those 
creators will be less likely motivated to create new copyrighted works; which could 
weaken the policy of the copyright law.94By criminalizing the infringing conducts 
would help those owners to gain the maximum amount of profit from their copyrighted 
works. Thus, they would be encouraged to create new types of creative works. 
     However, for the cases of non-commercial purpose infringing 
conducts, they only cause slight or no harm to the copyright owners. Such infringing 
conducts are therefore not the factor which would demotivate those owners to create 
further creations. Thus, the national policy of motivating new creative efforts is not 
affected. By criminalizing conducts which are not harmful to both of the owners and the 
national copyright policy, the society would not receive any benefit from such 
prevention of harm.  
    b. The Educative Benefit 
     According to Professor Geraldine Szott Moohr 95 ’s point of view, 
criminalizing the infringing conducts may result in an educative benefit for the 
community.96She argued that by putting them in the form of legislative statements, the 
public would be educated and thus, forming new social norms that infringements are 
                                                 
92 Ibid., p. 791. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Geraldine Szott Moohr, American University Law Review 54, p. 791. 
95 Geraldine Szott Moohr is the professor of law at University of Houston 
specialized in criminal and employment law. 
96 Geraldine Szott Moohr, American University Law Review, p. 796. 
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wrongful conducts. However, there was also a research stating that criminal law is a 
most effective tool in enforcing the social norm when it has already existed.97In this case 
of copyright, people in the community do not share a social norm that the copyright 
infringement should be criminalized.98Therefore, we may not be able to receive the 
utmost benefit of educating the public about the copyright infringement. 
     In cases of the non-commercial purpose infringements; most people in 
the society do not have a view that they are wrongful conducts which should be 
criminalized. For example, according to their views, an illegal downloading of a song 
from the internet is definitely not as wrongful as an event of thieve stealing properties 
from others.  
     Therefore, when harsh criminal penalties are applied to conducts which 
the social norms are not yet in place to condemn such conducts; the result of 
criminalization tends to be in the opposite direction from the educative benefit. When 
many individuals are committing such lack of moral wrongfulness conducts which each 
of the individual’s act only causes slight or no harm to the copyright owners; other 
people would learn that they are not bad things to do and feel that such materials are 
free for the public to use. As a result, they would have less respect for the criminal 
copyright law. Social norms against the acts of infringements are thus not able to be 
formed when imposed harsh criminal penalties not in proportionate to the acts of 
infringements. 
3.2.2 The Costs of Criminalizing Copyright Infringement Conduct 
a. Costs of Society’s Response  
  The most widely known costs of crime are the costs of society’s 
response.99Such costs include the expenses: “on police and other law enforcement 
                                                 
97 Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, Justice, Liability & Blame, (Westview 
Press: 1995) p. 1-3. 
98 Geraldine Szott Moohr, American University Law Review, p. 797. 
99 Jacek Czabanski. Estimates of Cost of Crime: History, Methodologies, and 
Implications (Springer 2008), p. 16. 
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agencies, prosecutors, judges (in criminal courts), prisons and other correctional 
facilities, probation officers, etc…”100 
  However, the border lines between the efforts in minimizing crimes 
and other activities can sometimes be blurred.101 For example, the staff that the movie 
theater hires has a duty to sell and collect movie tickets, service the customers, while he 
also has a duty to monitor customers to make sure that there would be no copyright 
infringement by camcording. Consequently, the budgets that the government spend to 
enforce the criminal copyright law could only indicate the minimum amount of 
expenditures that the society put on crime.102 
  In addition, the expenditures in enforcing copyright crimes are actually 
more than the amount of taxes.103 There are also costs in collecting taxes; and may 
eventually cause more crimes themselves.104  
  Furthermore, due to the high standard of proof, the costs of the criminal 
prosecutions are usually higher than the litigations in civil cases. For example, the high 
costs in the investigation and finding of evidences in order to meet that standard. 
Consequently, when it comes to the criminal cases; it means that the state has to hold 
the burdens for the costs as above stated. 
  Especially, in case of the criminal prosecutions for non-commercial 
purpose copyright infringements, in which they do not cause harm to the public order 
or the national copyright policy; this means that the state has to spend substantial budget 
merely to protect the private interests of the copyright owners not for the public benefits. 
b. Costs of Reduction of Access to Copyrighted Works  
  As stated, copyright law has its aim to balance the rights of the 
individuals and the public access. However, the imposition of criminal penalties to 
copyright law may create the feeling that copyrighted work actually belongs to the 
                                                 
100 Ibid. 
101 Jacek Czabanski, Ibid. 
102 Ibid., p. 17. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
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owner the way physical object does.105Therefore, by imposing the criminal penalties 
may be able to encourage new copyrighted works; while reducing the public access to 
them. This contradicts with the idea of copyright policy which equally emphasizes on 
the public access to such material.106 In other words, the imposition of criminal penalties 
to copyright law may imbalance those two objectives of copyright law. 
  Specifically, the imposition of criminal penalties to the non-
commercial purpose infringing conducts; which means that people may be subjected to 
such penalties even if the infringements are only for their personal uses. This may reduce 
motivation for people to access to all kinds of works even in the lawful situations. As a 
result, fewer ideas would be generate to develop new kinds of creations.   
c. Costs of Respect to Criminal Law 
  If harsh criminal penalties are imposed to conducts which are not 
viewed as wrongful or harmful, they may lower both of the effectiveness and society’s 
respect to the law.107  This is due to the fact that people would reject rules which seem 
to be unfair to certain group of people.108 In the case of copyright, the social norm 
against infringing conducts is not yet in place. Most people in the society have a view 
that the acts of infringement are not as wrongful as other crimes. Consequently, this may 
provide the opposite effect in a way that it is less likely that people would comply with 
the law. 
  The assessment in this case may be divided into two circumstances. 
The first circumstance is the social norm for the non-commercial purpose infringing 
conducts. In this case, people in the society certainly do not view them as wrongful 
conducts which should be criminalized. This is due to the fact that each of the individual 
infringer’s acts only causes slight harm to the copyright owners. Therefore, their 
economic interests are not much affected by each of the infringer; only accumulative 
                                                 
105  Stuart Green, “Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some 
Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property 
Rights,” Hastings Law Review 54 (2002): 167, 215. 
106 Geraldine Szott Moohr, American University Law Review, p. 801. 
107 Geraldine Szott Moohr, American University Law Review, p. 801. 
108 Geraldine Szott Moohr, American University Law Review, p. 803. 
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harms from this type of conducts that may lead to some losses of profits for the copyright 
owners. Thus, it is undoubtedly not fair to punish each individual infringer for the 
accumulated harms caused by many infringers. Consequently, when criminal penalties 
are imposed to this type of conducts; people would reject such punishments and have 
less respect for the law. 
  However, it can be assessed differently in the case of commercial 
purpose infringing conducts. Copyright owners may lose a lot of profits and their market 
positions due to such competitive acts of infringements. This creates unfair competitions 
for those owners who have invested their skills into the copyrighted works. In very large 
commercial scale infringements, they may place great effects on the economic systems 
of the countries as they cause large amount of loss profits to the owners. In addition, this 
type of infringements could lead to other crimes such as money laundering and 
organized crimes. Hence, it is more likely that people would view them as wrongful 
conducts which deserve punishments.  Thus, the criminal penalties imposed on this type 
of conducts would not be rejected as they are important tools in deterring the behaviors 
of the infringers.      
  In sum, according to the cost-benefit analysis, it can be seen that the 
costs in imposing criminal penalties to the non-commercial purpose infringements 
exceed the benefits from doing so. The society as a whole would not receive benefit 
from the prevention of harm as such conducts are not harmful to both of the copyright 
owners and national copyright policy. In addition, the educative benefit cannot also be 
achieved as most of people in the society have a view that it is not fair to inflict criminal 
penalties to those individual infringers who only cause slight harms. As a consequence, 
people would have less respect to criminal law. Lastly, there would not be a balance 
between the private and public interests as the application of excessive criminal 
penalties to protect the owners would reduce the incentives in accessing to the works to 
create further creations. Therefore, the assessment has suggested that it is not 
appropriate for the state to impose criminal penalties to the non-commercial purpose 
infringements as there are far greater costs than the benefits of such legislation. 
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Conclusion 
  Consequently, from the assessments based on the principle of crimes, human 
right claim and the economic perspective of the copyright law, they have suggested that 
the imposition of  criminal sanctions for the non-commercial purpose infringements are 
not appropriate and proportionate to solve such infringing problems. On the other hand, 
there are justifications to inflict criminal sanctions upon the commercial purpose 
infringers; which are in compliance with the obligation stated in Article 61 of the Trips 
Agreement. Hence, this may be time for the state legislation to review criminal sanctions 
provisions under the Copyright Act B.E. 2537; and if they are to be amended, is not it 
also time to improve our copyright civil litigation system to maintain a balance between 
private and public interests? The questions are still waiting to be answered. 
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